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How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current
Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through a Comparison
with the Attorney-Client Privilege
In 1813, a New York court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause
prohibited the state from compelling a Catholic priest to disclose information learned in a confidential confession.1 This decision to preserve the clergy-penitent privilege2 on constitutional grounds3 is the
central feature of one of the great stories concerning church and
state in America. Daniel Phillips had knowingly received stolen
goods.4 Following the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, Phillips
confessed to Father Kohlman. Determined to right the wrong, Phillips later delivered the goods to Father Kohlman who then returned
them to the original owner. Apprised of these events by the original
owner, the state subpoenaed Father Kohlman to testify regarding
Phillips before a grand jury. To prevent Father Kohlman from being
forced to choose between an obligation to God and an obligation to
the state, the Phillips court ruled that “[t]he only course is, for the
court to declare that he shall not testify or act at all.”5 This conflict
1. People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) was not officially published. The case is
abstracted at Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 W. L.J. 109 (1843) [hereinafter
Privileged Communications to Clergymen I], and at Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1
CATH. LAW. 199 (1955) [Privileged Communications to Clergymen II]. Although more difficult to encounter, the complete unofficial report from which the above abstracts were drawn
was published as WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (Da Capo Press
1974) (1813).
2. Although the phrase “privilege protecting confidential communications with clergy”
is more legally correct (acknowledging that the privilege must protect confidential communications with clergy in a way that does not favor one religion over another to avoid Establishment
Clause problems), this Comment shall use the less burdensome “clergy-penitent privilege” for
the sake of consistency with existing scholarship.
3. See People v. Phillips, (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) at 112–13; Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 1, at 207 (“Suppose that a decision of this court, or a law of
the state should prevent the administration of [a basic Protestant sacrament] . . . , would not
the constitution be violated, and the freedom of religion be infringed? Every man who hears
me will answer in the affirmative. Will not the same result follow, if we deprive the Roman
[C]atholic of one of his ordinances?”).
4. See SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 4–5. The brief summary of the facts provided here is
taken entirely from Sampson.
5. See Privileged Communications to Clergymen II, supra note 1, at 203; see also Privileged Communications to Clergymen I, supra note 1, at 112.
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between the state’s coercive power to collect evidence and the right
to maintain confidential certain religious communications lies at the
center of every challenge to the clergy-penitent privilege. The holding in People v. Phillips is significant because it reflects an important
early understanding of the phrase “free exercise of religion.” The essential aspect of this understanding was that the First Amendment
guaranteed state accommodation of religious behavior that may not
conform to generally applicable law.6 A second legal basis that the
Phillips court could have relied on is also important. If understood as
a structural restraint on governmental power, the Establishment
Clause also could have required the Phillips court to prevent state interference with Father Kohlman’s confidential communications.7
Although Phillips represents a triumphant early moment for religious freedom in America, its influence has been limited. The Supreme Court has not decided whether either of the First Amendment religion clauses requires maintenance of the clergy-penitent
privilege. Still, confidential communications with clergy have generally been protected under state law, much like the attorney-client
privilege.8 However, as all fifty states have enacted mandatory abusereporting laws,9 the status of such privileges has been called into
question. The seriousness of a single incident of child abuse is unquestionable; national child abuse rates10 are therefore a cause for
great concern. Unfortunately, concern over child abuse has fueled an
attempt to undermine the clergy-penitent privilege. To justify their
assault on a basic religious freedom, those who advocate abrogation
of the clergy-penitent privilege imply that policy-makers must choose
either to uphold the clergy-penitent privilege or effectively combat
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
7. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998).
8. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 72–77 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE ch. 5 (1999).
9. For a summary of the several states’ abuse-reporting laws, see National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, Overview of Child Abuse and Neglect State
Statute Elements, Reporting Statutes, at http://www.calib.com/nccanch/statutes/index.cfm
#Laws (Jan. 31, 2002).
10. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated that 270,000 children were victims of physical or sexual abuse in 1999. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, ADMIN. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999: REPORTS
FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM ch. 2.2
(2001).
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child abuse.11 Framing the issue in such terms is an attempt to leverage the appropriate emotional response to a vile crime like child
abuse against a religious liberty interest that may seem less urgent.
Still, one can fully condemn child abuse while defending the
clergy-penitent privilege. However persuasive it may be, the binary
approach suggesting that one must either choose between the privilege or child abuse prevention is simplistic and ultimately flawed.
First, such an approach implies that, compared to the state, clergy
are unconcerned when it comes to child abuse prevention. Contrary
to this implication—and despite the rare case involving an abusive
clergy member12—it seems reasonable to assume that both clergy
and the state are deeply concerned about the well-being of children.
Second, this approach proposes a probable non-solution: abrogation
of the clergy-penitent privilege is not likely to diminish child abuse.13
Third, adopting this approach ignores the fact that alternative means,
such as traditional law enforcement methods and less controversial
reporting requirements, remain intact to enforce child abuse laws.14
Finally, the claim that one must choose between the clergy-penitent
privilege and child abuse prevention fails to acknowledge that clergypenitent communication may effectively combat child abuse.15
Considering these points—and the religious significance of the
practice of confidential confession16—abrogation of the clergypenitent privilege through abuse-reporting laws should be a cause for
great concern.
Drawing a comparison between the clergy-penitent and attorneyclient privileges, this Comment will demonstrate that if anything, the
clergy-penitent privilege merits more protection from abrogation
than the attorney-client privilege. Part I of this Comment will sum-

11. See, e.g., Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will it Save Our Children?,
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 963, 998–99 (1998) (assuming a significant conflict between evidentiary privileges and child abuse prevention, and concluding that abrogation of privileges is necessary to prevent child abuse).
12. Accounts of abusive clergy members are far too common. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield,
Two Priests Who Abused Boys in Maine Are Removed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, § 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/10/national/10PRIE.html. Still, this Comment
assumes that such predators are relatively uncommon in relation to the many thousands of
clergy members of every religion who live up to the high standards they teach.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 105–07.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 104 and 171.
15. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 70–76 and 185.
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marize current state laws regarding mandatory abuse-reporting and
compare the effect these laws have had on the clergy-penitent and
attorney-client privileges. Part II of this Comment will analyze the
clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges in relation to the traditional rationales for evidentiary privileges to assess whether the current difference in status between the two privileges relates to a difference in value or importance. Part III will analyze the clergy-penitent
and attorney-client privileges’ respective claims to protection under
the Constitution. Finally, Part IV will look beyond the traditional rationales and constitutional arguments to consider some alternative
explanations for the current difference in status between the clergypenitent and attorney-client privileges.
I. THE EFFECT OF ABUSE-REPORTING LAWS
While child abuse is not a new problem, taking child abuse seriously may be considered relatively new.17 The Children’s Bureau of
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
promulgated the first model abuse-reporting laws in 1963.18 By
1967, all fifty states had adopted abuse-reporting laws.19 These laws
were initially narrow in scope, requiring only physicians to report
suspected child abuse.20 However, as the federal government offered
grants to states that enacted more expansive abuse-reporting laws,21
most states enacted expansive laws to qualify themselves for the federal funds. The stated purpose for abuse-reporting laws is to protect
children from the harm associated with child abuse.22 Abusereporting laws generally impose both a duty to report and criminal
penalties or potential civil liability on those who fail to comply.

17. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 726 (1987).
18. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, THE
ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING
OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963).
19. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 727.
20. Id.
21. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5107 (1995)).
22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (Lexis 2001) (imposing duty to report
to “protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and
neglect”). Professor Mitchell observes that every state’s abuse-reporting law is based on the
same objective. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 725 (“Every state has a statute aimed at discovering and stopping child abuse.”) (footnote omitted).
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Despite some basic similarities, significant variation between the
abuse-reporting laws of the several states raises a variety of concerns.23 One of the more troublesome problems with abusereporting laws is vague language. Of the fifty-one statutes under consideration, eighteen name any “individual,” “person,” or “other person” as a mandatory reporter.24 Using such universal language without specific guidance as to its effect on preexisting law, many abusereporting laws leave considerable uncertainty as to their intended effect on evidentiary privileges.25 Still, a significant number of reporting laws are clear about their effect on otherwise privileged communications regarding abuse.26
A. Reporting Laws and the Clergy-Penitent Privilege
The effect on the clergy-penitent privilege achieved by the statutory schemes of the several states may be considered in four basic
categories: (1) complete abrogation; (2) conditional preservation;
(3) complete preservation; and (4) uncertain. Statutes enacted in
nine states achieve a complete abrogation of the clergy-penitent
privilege in relation to the duty to report suspected abuse.27 Statutes
enacted in eighteen states have imposed a conditional duty to report

23. Such concerns involve various attempts to define clergy, ambiguity regarding
whether one or both parties to a privileged communication may invoke the privilege, and constitutionally questionable attempts to limit or extend the privilege.
24. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (Lexis 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (Lexis
2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(a) (Lexis 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (Lexis 2000);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(1) (Lexis 2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704(a)(1)
(Lexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28711(1) (Lexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Lexis 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:6-8.10 (Lexis 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3(A) (Lexis 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B301 (Lexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (A)(1) (Lexis 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40-11-3(a) (Lexis 2001); Act of June 7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (Lexis 2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(1) (Lexis 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205(a) (Lexis
2001).
25. See infra notes 30 and 37 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text.
27. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101, -103 (Lexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §
43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:29, -C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-301, -310 (Lexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103, 7113 (Lexis
2000); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 40-11-3, -11 (Lexis 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (Lexis
2001); Act of June 7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-403); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Lexis 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
49-6A-2, 7 (Lexis 2001).
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abuse subject to a clergy-penitent privilege limited by various
terms.28 Statutes enacted in four states specifically preserve the
clergy-penitent privilege without express limits.29 Since their statutes
do not name clergy as reporters nor comment on the effect of a
broad duty to report, the status of the clergy-penitent privilege in relation to abuse reporting is uncertain in the remaining nineteen
states and the District of Columbia.30 In some of these states the
strength of the clergy-penitent privilege presumably allows clergy to
refrain from reporting child abuse.31 On the other hand, the strength
of the language found in the abuse-reporting statutes of other states

28. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-805, 13-3620 (Lexis 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §§
11165.7, 11166 (Lexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.201, .204 (Lexis 2000); IDAHO CODE
§§ 16-1619, -1620 (Lexis 2000); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-11-1, 31-33-5-1, -2 (Lexis
2000); LA. CODE OF JUV. PROC. ANN. art. 603(13), 609(A)(1), 610(F) (Lexis 2000); Act of
June 1, 2001, sec. 5, 2001 Me. Laws 345 (Lexis) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 4011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-704, -705 (Lexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.556 (Lexis 2000); Act of April 1, 2001, sec. 4, 2001 Mont. Laws 311 (Lexis) (to be codified at MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-3-201); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-711, -714 (Lexis
2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432B.220, .250 (Lexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.10
(Lexis 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (Lexis 2001); Act of April 23, 2001, sec. 148,
2001 Ore. HB 2609 (Lexis) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005); Act of April 23,
2001, sec. 149, 2001 Ore. HB 2609 (Lexis) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (Lexis 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2001);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-205, -210 (Lexis 2001).
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Lexis 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
620.050(2) (Lexis 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-550 (Lexis 2000); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.44.060(3) (Lexis 2001).
30. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-10, 26-14-3 (Lexis 2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.020,
.060 (Lexis 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (Lexis 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
19-3-304, -311 (Lexis 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1321.02, .05 (Lexis 2001); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-5 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-1.1, 350-5 (Lexis 2000); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (Lexis 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.74 (Lexis 2001); Act of May
7, 2001, §§ 1-2, 2001 Ia. HF 680 (Lexis) (to be codified at IOWA CODE. § 232.69); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (Lexis 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A, 51B (Lexis
2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.623, .631 (Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
210.115, .140, 568.110 (Lexis 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-3(A), -5(A) (Lexis 2001);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (Lexis 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Anderson
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-3, -15 (Lexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913
(Lexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.3, 11 (Lexis 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981
(Lexis 2000).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Lexis 2001) (“Unless the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited
Christian Science practitioner, shall not be allowed [to] disclose a confession or confidence
made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor.”).
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in the uncertain category may suggest that abrogation was intended.32
B. Reporting Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege
The effect on the attorney-client privilege achieved by the statutory schemes of the several states may be considered in the same four
categories employed above: (1) complete abrogation; (2) conditional
preservation; (3) complete preservation; and (4) uncertain. Only two
states seem to have abrogated the attorney-client privilege whenever
it would conflict with a duty to report.33 Three other states impose a
duty to report only when that knowledge is obtained outside of the
attorney-client relationship.34 Seventeen states have expressly preserved the attorney-client privilege.35 Of these, eight states have preserved the attorney-client privilege exclusively while apparently abrogating all other privileges.36 Due to ambiguous statutory language,
the effect of abuse-reporting statutes on the attorney-client privilege
is uncertain in the remaining twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia.37 However, the attorney-client privilege is customarily
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-3, -10 (Lexis 2001).
33. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
261.101 (Lexis 2000).
34. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (Lexis 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.421(A)(2) (Anderson 2001); Act of April 23, 2001, sec. 149, 2001 Ore. HB 2609
(Lexis) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419.010).
35. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (Lexis 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-805(B)
(Lexis 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Lexis 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (Lexis
2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Lexis 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2) (Lexis
2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-705(a)(2) (Lexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.631 (Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Lexis 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
169-C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (Lexis 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5025.1-10 (Lexis 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Lexis 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7550 (Lexis 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060(3) (Lexis 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6A-7 (Lexis 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (Lexis 2001).
36. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (Lexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (Lexis 2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631 (Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Lexis 2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (Lexis 2000);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Lexis 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-7 (Lexis 2001).
37. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.020, .060 (Lexis 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507
(Lexis 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (Lexis 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19-3-304, -311 (Lexis 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101, -103 (Lexis 2001);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1321.02, .05 (Lexis 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (Lexis 2000);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-1.1, 350-5 (Lexis 2000); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4
(Lexis 2001); 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/11-20.2 (Lexis 2001); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3132-11-1, 31-33-5-1, -2 (Lexis 2000); Act of May 7, 2001, §§ 1-2, 2001 Ia. HF 680 (Lexis)
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strong in many of the “uncertain” states.38 In fact, Professor
Mosteller has argued that state legislatures did not intend to abrogate the attorney-client privilege through abuse-reporting laws.39
Considering Mosteller’s argument, the strength of the attorneyclient privilege in many states, and the lack of reference to attorneys
in many abuse-reporting laws, there appears to be a strong presumption that abuse-reporting laws do not abrogate the attorney-client
privilege.40
C. Attorneys Protected, Clergy Neglected
Summarizing the preceding discussion, the following table facilitates comparison of the effect that abuse-reporting laws have had on
the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges.

(to be codified at IOWA CODE § 232.69); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.74 (Lexis 2001); LA.
CODE OF JUV. PROC. ANN. art. 603(13), 609(A)(1), 610(F) (Lexis 2000); Act of June 1,
2001, sec. 5, 2001 Me. Laws 345 (Lexis) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
4011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A, 51B (Lexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.556 (Lexis 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); Act of April 1, 2001,
sec. 4, 2001 Mont. Laws 311 (Lexis) (to be codified at MONT. CODE. ANN. §41-3-201);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-711, -714 (Lexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (Lexis
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-3(A), 5(A) (Lexis 2001); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413
(Lexis 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103, 7113 (Lexis 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6311 (Lexis 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-3, -15 (Lexis 2001); Act of June
7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (Lexis 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (Lexis 2001);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (Lexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.3, .11 (Lexis
2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Lexis 2000).
38. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-21 (Lexis 2001) (providing broad privilege for
“communications between attorney and client”).
39. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 223–24 (1992).
Mosteller argues that expansions of the attorney-client privilege to legislative and administrative proceedings and the principle that “an attorney may not defeat the privilege indirectly by
transmitting a statement regarding a client’s confidential communication through a third
party,” suggest that the attorney-client privilege maintains client communications confidential
despite abuse-reporting laws. Id. at 228–29.
40. See id. at 273 (concluding that “with the possible exception of one state, the legislation does not indicate any intention to abrogate the attorney-client privilege as it has been historically interpreted”) (footnotes omitted).
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Privilege Abrogated
Partial Abrogation
Privilege Maintained
Uncertain

Attorney-Client
Privilege
2
3
17
28 + DC

Clergy-Penitent
Privilege
9
18
4
19 + DC

In light of how many states have sought to protect or abrogate
the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges, the manner and extent of the abuse-reporting laws’ unequal effect on these privileges
becomes readily apparent. Perhaps most striking is the number of
states that have expressly preserved the privileges. While seventeen
states have preserved the attorney-client privilege without additional
limits,41 only four states have preserved the clergy-penitent privilege
without imposing additional limits.42 This difference in protection
presumably reflects a significant amount of concern in state legislatures for the attorney-client privilege and relatively little concern for
the preservation of the clergy-penitent privilege. Also notable is the
difference between the abuse-reporting laws that partially abrogate
the privileges at hand. Eighteen states limit the clergy-penitent privilege to various degrees while claiming to preserve it.43 In contrast,
three of the four states that name attorneys as mandatory reporters
preserve the confidentiality of communications with clients.44 In
other words, these three states impose an essentially meaningless
duty on attorneys to report, since it only applies to information not
obtained from clients.
The number of states that have abrogated the attorney-client and
clergy-penitent privileges is also significant. While abuse-reporting
laws apparently abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege in nine
states,45 the attorney-client privilege has been abrogated in only two
states.46 It is notable that the two states (Mississippi and Texas) that
abrogated the attorney-client privilege are among the states that also

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See supra note 35.
See supra note 29.
See supra note 28.
See supra note 34.
See supra note 27.
See supra note 33.
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abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege.47 Assuming that both the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges merit continued existence, the Texas and Mississippi abuse-reporting laws are the worst
conceived of all. For what it is worth, however, the Texas and Mississippi abuse-reporting laws at least appear even-handed.48 The
remaining seven states that abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege
have done so while simultaneously preserving the attorney-client
privilege.49 In contrast, no state has expressly preserved the clergypenitent privilege while abrogating the attorney-client privilege. This
difference in the number of states abrogating the attorney-client and
clergy-penitent privileges represents a particular assault on the clergypenitent privilege.
The numbers involved in these three points of comparison obviously represent only a small part of the total number of states. It is
important to bear in mind that the abuse-reporting laws in twentynine states are unclear as to how they affect the attorney-client privilege,50 while the abuse-reporting laws in nineteen states are unclear
as to how they affect the clergy-penitent privilege.51 Therefore, it
seems reasonable to view the reporting laws that actually define how
they affect the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges as an indication of how unclear abuse-reporting laws are likely to be understood to affect evidentiary privileges in the future.
Disparate treatment of the attorney-client and clergy-penitent
privileges in relation to abuse-reporting laws is also apparent when
examining current statutory schemes of individual states. The eight
states that preserve only the attorney-client privilege52 provide perhaps the most striking example of such divergent treatment. The

47. See supra notes 27 and 33.
48. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (Lexis 2000) (“The requirement to report
under this section applies without exception to an individual whose personal communications
may otherwise be privileged, including an attorney, a member of the clergy. . . .”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001).
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101, -103 (Lexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 169-C:29, C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-301, -310 (Lexis 2000);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103, 7113 (Lexis 2000); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 40-11-3, -11
(Lexis 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (Lexis 2001); Act of June 7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001
Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-6A-2, -7 (Lexis 2001).
50. See supra note 30.
51. See supra note 37.
52. See supra note 36.
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statutory schemes of these states vary by the means in which they
treat differently the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges.
Statutes enacted in Alabama, Michigan, and Missouri specifically abrogate some privileges while expressly preserving only the attorneyclient privilege.53 Such a failure to deal with the clergy-penitent privilege in either a negative or positive manner while addressing other
privileges seems to reflect indifference toward the clergy-penitent
privilege. Statutes enacted in Florida, North Carolina, and Rhode Island impose a universal duty to report that exclusively preserves the
attorney-client privilege.54 Such a scheme seems to suggest particular
concern for the attorney-client privilege and general indifference toward all other privileges. Statutes enacted in New Hampshire and
West Virginia name clergy as mandatory reporters while preserving
exclusively the attorney-client privilege.55 These states seem to have
made the policy judgment in unambiguous terms that the attorneyclient privilege merits protection while the clergy-penitent privilege
(among others) does not. Consideration of the legislative history behind these statutory schemes would presumably lend support to the
preceding inferences regarding the policy judgments underlying
these statutes; such a study, however, is beyond the scope of this
Comment. At this point, it is sufficient to demonstrate that a significant number of state legislatures have simultaneously preserved the
attorney-client privilege and destroyed the clergy-penitent privilege
in relation to abuse-reporting laws.
II. KEEPING WITH TRADITIONAL RATIONALES
Evidentiary privileges were initially justified as a means of
preserving the honor of those entrusted with confidential
communications.56 The honor justification was abandoned relatively
early, and in no uncertain terms.57 A utilitarian justification for
53. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (Lexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631
(Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Lexis 2000).
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (Lexis
2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Lexis 2001).
55. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (Lexis 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A7 (Lexis 2001).
56. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286 (John
T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (“In the trials of the 1600s, the obligations of honor among
gentlemen . . . were often put forward as a sufficient ground for maintaining silence.”).
57. See id. § 2286 n.16 (quoting Hill’s Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 1362 (1777)) (“[I]f this
point of honour was to be so sacred . . . the most atrocious criminals would every day escape
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evidentiary privileges has been more significant and lasting than the
honor justification.58 Authors have also articulated a rights-based justification claiming that evidentiary privileges are required by conceptions of privacy or autonomy.59 The following analysis will refer to
the utilitarian and privacy or autonomy-based justifications to assess
whether the current difference in status of the clergy-penitent and
attorney-client privileges may be attributed to valid judgments regarding their underlying value.
A. Confidentiality and Maximization
Professor John H. Wigmore defined the utilitarian justification
for evidentiary privileges in his influential treatise on evidence.60 According to Wigmore, consideration of evidentiary privileges should
“start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to
give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions
which may exist are distinctly exceptional.”61 Therefore, Wigmore argued, individuals may refuse to produce evidence only “when the
benefit gained by exacting [evidence] would in general be less valuable than the disadvantage caused.”62 In Trammel v. United States,63
the Supreme Court acknowledged these basic premises for the utilitarian justification of evidentiary privileges.64 In Trammel, a utilitarian analysis led the Court to limit the right to withhold evidence under the spousal privilege to the witness-spouse.65 State courts have
likewise acknowledged the underlying basis of the utilitarian justification, and have generally sought to limit the application of most privi-

punishment; and therefore it is that the wisdom of the law knows nothing of that point of
honour.”).
58. See infra Part III.A.
59. See infra Part III.B.
60. See WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2192.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
64. Id. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)) (stating privileges “must be strictly construed and accepted ‘only to the very
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth’”).
65. Id. at 52–53. The Court reasoned that “[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify
against the other in a criminal proceeding,” the social benefit that the privilege was meant to
preserve (“marital harmony”) is probably already beyond preservation. Id. at 52.
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leges.66 Wigmore argued that an evidentiary privilege should only be
recognized under the utilitarian justification if the following four
prerequisites were met:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one in which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.67

Rather than consider the cost imposed on particular individuals
before a court in litigation, Wigmore intended the fourth criteria to
entail a balancing analysis between the overall benefit derived from
the preservation of confidential communications against the overall
cost of maintaining a privilege to the legal system.68 Although this
analysis has been criticized as blind to individual concerns, it has also
been praised for striking a balance between society’s long-term interest in the discovery of evidence and the interests supporting the
maintenance of evidentiary privileges.69 The following analysis will
focus on the costs and benefits related to the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges in the terms of Wigmore’s four criteria.
1. Utility and the clergy-penitent privilege
a. Confidentiality. An expectation of confidentiality accompanies
communications between clergy and those who confess or seek similar counseling. In some cases, this expectation is reinforced by strict
church-imposed confidentiality rules. The rules governing the Seal of
the Confession found in the Catholic Code of Cannon Law provide

66. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 641 (Wash. 2001); People v. Hamacher,
438 N.W.2d 43, 56–57 (Mich. 1989) (Boyle, J., dissenting).
67. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285 (citation omitted).
68. See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1473 (1985) [hereinafter Developments].
69. Id. at 1473–74.
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one example. According to cannon law, “The Sacramental seal is inviolable. Accordingly, it is absolutely wrong for a confessor in any
way to betray the penitent, for any reason whatsoever, whether by
word or in any other fashion.”70 The 1917 Code provided that the
confessor was to “diligently take care” not to betray the penitent.71
However, the 1983 revised Code of Cannon Law reflects increased
emphasis on confidentiality, providing that “it is absolutely wrong
for a confessor in any way to betray the penitent.”72 Furthermore,
the Code of Cannon Law provides that “[a] confessor who directly
violates the sacramental seal incurs [an automatic] excommunication
reserved to the Apostolic See; he who does so only indirectly is to be
punished according to the gravity of the offense.”73 Another example
of such confidentiality rules comes from The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church”). Confession of serious sins in
confidential interviews is a central requirement of the LDS Church.74
Confession may alert church authorities that disciplinary action, such
as excommunication, is necessary.75 “The bishop is expected to keep
confidential the confession of the transgressor” according to LDS
Church policy.76
Adherents to a religion that has not devised strict confidentiality
rules may also seek private spiritual counsel “in a confidence that
[what they say] will not be disclosed.”77 Such an individual is likely
to expect that discussion of personal problems with a religious authority is completely confidential. Furthermore, many different aspects of such a discussion would tend to confirm this expectation of
privacy. Confirmation of an expectation of privacy might come from
communication in a private location, assurances of confidentiality, or
70. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
71. 1917 CODE c.889, §§ 1–2.
72. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
73. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1. For additional discussion of the Seal of the Confession, see
Raymond C. O’Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1991).
74. See SPENCER W. KIMBALL, THE MIRACLE OF FORGIVENESS 179 (3d ed. 1993).
“The confession of . . . major sins to a proper Church authority is one of those requirements
made by the Lord. . . . This procedure of confession assures proper controls and protection for
the Church and its people and sets the feet of the transgressor on the path of true repentance.”
Id.
75. See id. at 325 (discussing duty of certain authorized church leaders to initiate official
action “in cases which warrant either disfellowshipment or excommunication”).
76. Id. at 334.
77. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285; see also supra text accompanying note 67.
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the absence of a warning that the communications are not confidential.78 Where church-imposed rules of confidentiality do not apply,
the analysis may require additional factual consideration on a caseby-case basis. Concerned that such a system would be abused, some
states have determined that the clergy-penitent privilege does not
apply to communications made outside of a formal confessional or
similar confidential spiritual counseling. This policy implicitly excludes communications made in the company of third persons or
clergy observations made in a non-confidential setting.79 While some
may go too far, such limitations may be necessary to ensure that the
clergy-penitent privilege does not provide undue protection to criminals.
b. Is confidentiality essential? Confidentiality is “essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation”80 between clergy
and penitent. First, fear that a clergy member may be compelled to
reveal the content of confidential communications would be a significant deterrent to those seeking to confess sins or receive similar
spiritual counseling.81 Since shame and fear already function as significant internal deterrents to the potential penitent, fear that communications with clergy would not remain confidential is particularly
likely to deter spiritual counseling. If fear of non-confidentiality
causes would-be penitents to completely avoid spiritual counseling,
the clergy-penitent relation is obviously damaged. Furthermore, laws
that interfere with the clergy-penitent privilege force clergy members
to choose between loyalty to God and the state.82 While this choice
may cause some clergy members to violate spiritual laws, the quality
of devotion that leads to a life of religious service is more likely to
78. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1475.
79. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (Lexis 2001) (“No minister of the gospel,
or priest of any denomination whatsoever, or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner,
shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the
course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.”); see also Mitchell,
supra note 17, at 747–55.
80. See supra text accompanying note 63.
81. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 812 (“If, to comply with statutory reporting requirements, clergy begin to disclose otherwise confidential information, the expectation of secrecy will be destroyed. In the short run, confiders will feel betrayed; in the long run, they are
likely to stop confiding in the clergy.”).
82. See Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and
Doctrine, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 145, 168 (2000) (“There are laws that some people believe
are greater than the state. Such is the situation with the Catholic priest threatened with automatic excommunication if he violates the confessional seal.”).
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lead clergy members to choose God over the state. If such defiance
leads to the imprisonment of the clergy member,83 the clergypenitent relationship would obviously be degraded.
Claims that people generally seek spiritual counsel from clergy
members without any knowledge of the clergy-penitent privilege84
gravely underestimate how quickly most religious communities
would communicate the fact that Father Jones or Pastor Green has
been subpoenaed to testify or imprisoned.85 While the state may successfully violate the religious liberties of the first person whose secrets it seeks to discover from a clergy member, the remainder of that
religious community would become acutely aware that the clergypenitent privilege has been significantly limited or destroyed.86
c. Public sentiment.87 In his treatise on evidence, Wigmore hinted
that lack of public support explains the absence of the clergypenitent privilege in English and early American common law.88
While this may be accurate, nonexistence of the clergy-penitent privilege in a society with few confidential clergy-penitent communications sheds little light on the current situation. The fact that all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes ensuring
the place of the clergy-penitent privilege demonstrates public approval of the privilege.89 Additional public approval of the clergypenitent privilege may be found in federal law: the clergy-penitent
privilege has been recognized “in light of reason and experience”90 in
federal common law.91 Rather than reflecting public disapproval, the

83. See infra note 85.
84. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, at 320–21.
85. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 723–24 (discussing case of Pastor John Mellish, a
Nazarene minister put in jail for refusal to divulge information learned from a confession);
O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 73, at 1–2.
86. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1475 (“[K]nowledge of a privilege may not so
much encourage communications as knowledge of its absence would deter them. Thus, the
relevant question is not whether too few people know of a privilege, but whether enough people would become aware of (and act on) its absence.”) (footnotes omitted).
87. It is unclear why public disapproval would justify non-recognition of a socially beneficial privilege. Thus, the third of Wigmore’s prerequisites may not merit considerable weight
in comparison with the other three criteria. See supra note 67.
88. See WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2396.
89. See WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN & JOHN C. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE:
PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 102 (3d ed. 1989).
90. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
91. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384–85 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889–90 (7th Cir. 1987).
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current threat to the clergy-penitent privilege92 probably stems from
other, less democratic influences.93
d. Costs and benefits. The benefits society enjoys from the clergypenitent privilege outweigh the limitation it imposes on the state’s
power to collect evidence. Since gathering empirical evidence to
support or refute this claim is probably impossible,94 this conclusion
follows from a few general observations. Although the estimated social cost of the clergy-penitent privilege is presumably significant,95
this cost is probably not as great as one might first expect. This is so
because the cost of a privilege (measured in undiscoverable evidence)
would not properly include information that would not exist but for
that privilege.96 Thus, the evidence-gathering panacea in which
clergy members serve the state as informants is imagined; the cost
imposed on society by the clergy-penitent privilege consists only of
information that would be volunteered to clergy in the absence of
the clergy-penitent privilege.
Balanced against these costs, the sustained legitimacy and eminently positive social behavior that the state derives from the clergypenitent privilege carry considerable weight. Perhaps more than any
other privilege, the clergy-penitent privilege protects communications that are likely to be withheld from the state even in the face of
serious legal consequences. One author illustrates this situation by
alluding to Antigone’s decision to simultaneously obey the gods and
disobey King Creon.97 In such circumstances, attempts to compel

92. See supra Part I.
93. See infra Part IV.
94. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1474 (pointing out that “no solid empirical data
exists to support the estimates of either critics or proponents as to either the costs or the benefits of privileges”). This lack of empirical evidence on either side is likely to persist due to the
presumably insurmountable difficulty inherent in proving the non-occurrence of an event: “the
extent to which people would communicate in the absence of the privilege.” Id. at 1477.
95. Wigmore hinted at the potential costs imposed on society by evidentiary privileges
when he stated that “[t]he whole life of the community, the regularity and continuity of its
relations, depends upon the coming of the witness.” WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2192.
96. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1477 (“Because at least some evidence presumably exists only because a privilege encouraged its creation, the unavailability of such evidence cannot properly be deemed a cost of having the privilege.”) (footnotes omitted).
97. Whitaker, supra note 82, at 168. “Nor did I deem that your decrees were of such
force that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life
is not of today or yesterday, but from all time . . . .” Id. (quoting SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in
THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES 119 (Sir Richard Claverhous Jebb trans., Moses Hadas
ed. 1967)) .
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clergy to reveal the content of confidential communications may lead
to highly visible spectacles of clergy imprisonment98 without actually
providing more evidence available to society. Standing alone, the will
to defy a legal requirement on the part of some members of society
does not justify an exception to that requirement. However, when
imposing specific duties, the state must consider its general ability to
ensure compliance. In addition to broad public disapproval, episodes
of clergy imprisonment may cause public doubts about the state’s
ability to compel compliance to rules of evidence.99 Such disapproval
and doubts may diminish the state’s ability to operate in other less
controversial areas.100 Therefore, by maintaining the clergy-penitent
privilege, the state sustains its own legitimacy.
Society also benefits from the clergy-penitent privilege as individuals improve their lives in the process of confidential confession
and similar spiritual counseling with clergy. When effective, such
confession and counseling instills in penitents a sense of responsibility, provides penitents with the encouragement to abandon behavior
that is condemned by church and state alike, and in the process, imparts moral understanding that leaves penitents better than they were
before committing the acts that caused them to seek clergy assistance
in the first place.101 Confidential confession or counseling with clergy
may be particularly effective because people longing to improve their
behavior willfully submit themselves to it (rather than being compelled as in the case of state-imposed rehabilitation). Confidential
confession or counseling may also be particularly effective because it
motivates penitents through reference to deeply held religious beliefs
and the related moral imperatives—a means of motivating desirable
behavior generally not available to the state. Thus, to the extent that
confidential confession and counseling lead people to overcome abusive behavior, the clergy-penitent privilege is consistent with the goal
98. See supra note 85.
99. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1498–1500. (“According to the image theory,
courts and legislatures have established the existing set of privileges because they minimize possible embarrassment to the legal system.”). Id. at 1498–99.
100. See id.
101. This sentence reflects the goals of confidential communications between clergy and
penitents in general. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of clergypenitent communications. Furthermore, any state evaluation as to the effectiveness of clergypenitent relation would presumably be suspect. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 765. (“[C]ourts
are . . . unqualified and in principle disqualified from establishing criteria to assess the quality
of clergy-confider consultations.”). Id.
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of preventing child abuse.102 The cumulative result of many people’s
efforts to overcome their harmful behavior through confidential
communications with clergy will naturally translate into broad social
benefits.
Contrary to these conclusions, some may argue that abusereporting laws generate more utility than does preserving the clergypenitent privilege. While successful efforts to preserve child health
and safety103 would provide significant and tangible benefits to society, the question remains whether abrogation of the clergy-penitent
privilege is necessary to protect children. Traditional methods of law
enforcement remain intact for the enforcement of child abuse laws.
Reporting requirements that are less controversial and arguably more
appropriate for their purpose, such as those requiring physicians to
report,104 also remain intact. To claim that abrogation of the clergypenitent privilege generates more utility than preservation of that
privilege also assumes that such abrogation is an effective means of
gathering information about abuse. Although it is not possible to
prove one way or the other,105 abrogation of the clergy-penitent
privilege is probably not an effective means of gathering information
about abuse for two reasons. First, even facing imprisonment, many
religious leaders are not likely to disclose confidential information
learned in confession or similar counseling.106 Second, abrogation of
the clergy-penitent privilege through an abuse-reporting law will almost certainly deter potential abusers from confessing.107 Thus, the
benefits society derives from the preservation of the clergy-penitent
privilege outweigh any benefits that might be derived from abrogation of that privilege.
2. Utility and the attorney-client privilege
a. Confidentiality. As with the clergy-penitent privilege, rules of
confidentiality support the expectation of confidentiality in an attorney-client relationship. Rules of professional conduct impose on at102. See O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 73, at 51 (“The child’s best interest may actually be furthered by maintaining the privilege. Thus, there is a false conflict between the state’s
goal and the religious practice because both can work toward the same end.”).
103. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
104. See supra text accompanying note 20.
105. See supra note 94.
106. See supra notes 82–83, 97–99 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 81; infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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torneys a duty not to disclose a client’s “confidential information.”108
In addition, these rules provide that attorneys who violate the duty
of confidentiality shall be subject to discipline.109 Although supported by rules of professional conduct, the expectation of confidentiality is far from unlimited in the attorney-client relationship. The
attorney-client privilege protects the communications of those seeking legal advice with the intent to comply with the law.110 As far as it
functions correctly, the crime-fraud exception111 ensures that the attorney-client privilege does not create a shield for those who seek legal advice to determine whether an illegal plot is likely to succeed.
The privilege may also be waived through disclosure.112 In addition,
it is important to note that some information protected by the privilege may be discovered from sources other than the attorney or client.113
b. Is confidentiality essential? Similar to the clergy-penitent privilege, confidentiality is “essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation”114 between attorney and client. The attorneyclient privilege encourages individuals who are uncertain about the
legality of their actions to seek legal advice. If such uncertain individuals anticipate that their attorney will be compelled to reveal the
content of client consultations, these individuals are more likely to
act without consultation.115 Such diminished consultation could significantly limit the effectiveness of an attorney-client relationship.
108. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4-101 (1995); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1995).
109. See supra note 108.
110. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1507 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege protects
the client’s ability to pursue his own goals within the confines of the law.”).
111. The attorney-client privilege does not cover communications regarding future or
ongoing crimes or frauds. See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating reasons for the attorney-client privilege “are completely eviscerated when a client consults an attorney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal assistance in carrying out a
contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud”).
112. The attorney-client privilege may be waived by any disclosure of privileged information. See United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979) (waiving privilege when
attorney gave information acquired from client to government); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d
976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (waiving privilege even though disclosure was inadvertent).
113. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1479.
114. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285; see also supra text accompanying note 67.
115. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) (interfering with
the privilege “will have a grave effect on our justice system as clients, knowing that their confidential communications may be subject to disclosure, will eventually be less than candid with
their attorneys or will consider foregoing legal advice altogether”).
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The partial or complete abrogation of the attorney-client privilege
would also cause a potential chilling of attorney tenacity.116 Without
the protection of a privilege, attorneys would be forced to balance
conflicting duties: the duty to obtain complete information, which
may involve considerable effort on the part of the attorney, and the
duty to testify about client communications in court.117 These conflicting duties may lead attorneys to obtain less than complete information from their clients—another situation that would constitute a
degradation of the attorney-client relationship.
c. Public sentiment. Popular support for the attorney-client privilege may be inferred from its sustained existence in state and federal
law. Since its recognition as a common-law principle, the attorneyclient privilege has played a significant role in state law.118 The attorney-client privilege was also recognized early and interpreted broadly
in federal courts.119 Still, the 1972 decision of Congress to reject the
proposed version of Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence120
highlights the tension between attorney self-interest and popular
support for the attorney-client privilege. A major concern of the opponents to the eventually rejected version of Article V was that the
advisory committee (a drafting body composed entirely of attorneys)
had conceived of an extensive attorney-client privilege while giving
minimal attention to other privileges and failing to even mention
privileges for some professions that had previously been protected.121
Rather than approve this system, Congress provided that evidentiary
privileges would “be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light
of reason and experience.”122
d. Costs and benefits. The societal benefits derived from the attorney-client privilege outweigh the costs it imposes. Since it cannot

116. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1476–77.
117. See Id.
118. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069–91 (1978).
119. See, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (“The general
rule is not disputed, that confidential communications between client and attorney, are not to
be revealed at any time.”).
120. See generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§
501.1–513.1 (4th ed. 1996).
121. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1468–69.
122. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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be established or refuted by empirical evidence,123 a few observations
will demonstrate this point. The costs associated with the attorneyclient privilege may be reasonably characterized as substantial.124
However, as with the clergy-penitent privilege, this cost is not as
great as it may at first seem.125 The benefits generally considered to
outweigh the cost of unavailable evidence refer to the role of attorneys in ensuring the effective operation of the United States legal
system. This rationale has been stated in various ways. In Ford Motor
Co. v. Leggat,126 the Supreme Court of Texas stated that “[t]he purpose of the privilege is to ensure the free flow of information between attorney and client, ultimately serving the broader societal interest of effective administration of justice.”127 The effective
operation of the legal system is presumably what the Supreme Court
had in mind in Upjohn Co. v. United States128 when it reasoned that
“sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and . . . such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by
the client.”129 For better or worse, the prevailing “instrumental” understanding of attorneys in the adversarial system may increase the
significance of the attorney-client privilege. The instrumental view of
attorneys asserts that the legal system functions best when attorneys
pursue stated client interests without concern for related moral or
social implications.130 Thus, the attorney-client privilege is a necessary condition for an attorney to function as a fully zealous instrument in the hands of a client.

123. See supra note 94.
124. See supra note 95.
125. See supra note 96; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (“Application of the attorney-client privilege . . . puts the adversary in no worse position than if the
communications had never taken place.”); Developments, supra note 68, at 1507–08 (“[T]o
the extent that the privilege induces a client to reveal information to his attorney, it keeps from
the court only sources of information that would not exist without the privilege.”).
126. 904 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1995).
127. Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
128. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
129. Id. at 389.
130. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 122–24 (1993). “The narrow view
insists that a lawyer is merely a specialized tool for effecting his client’s desires. It assumes that
the client comes to his lawyer with a fixed objective in mind. The lawyer then has two, and
only two, responsibilities: first, to supply his client with information concerning the legal consequences of his actions, and second, to implement whatever decision the client makes, so long
as it is lawful.” Id. at 123.
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3. What analysis under the utilitarian framework reveals
Under the test proposed by Wigmore, some similarly compelling
grounds justify the legal recognition of the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges. Communications between clergy and penitents and attorneys and clients are both accompanied by a significant
expectation of confidentiality.131 Also, forcing either an attorney or a
member of the clergy to act as an informant for the state would be
likely to render “full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties” impossible.132 In addition, public support of these
privileges can be inferred from their continued existence in state and
federal law.133 While both privileges merit preservation due to the
significant social benefits they provide, a side-by-side comparison of
these benefits reveals that their value to society is not identical.
The heightened value of the social utility provided by the clergypenitent privilege may be appreciated in light of a simple hypothetical. Assume an individual consults both an attorney and a member of
the clergy regarding behavior that is both legally and morally suspect. While the attorney will address the client’s legal concerns, the
member of the clergy will address the moral or spiritual well-being of
the penitent. Although the attorney will facilitate an efficient and fair
disposition of any legal problems, she is not likely to concern herself
with the underlying causes of the behavior that made legal representation necessary in the first place. In contrast, the cleric specifically
addresses the underlying causes to help the penitent overcome them.
To state the point differently, resolution of legal problems, although
important, should not be valued above a lasting moral change in an
individual that may prevent many (potentially more serious) legal
problems in the future.
Since the clergy-penitent privilege’s justification under Wigmore’s analysis is stronger than that generally asserted in defense of
the attorney-client privilege, the current difference in status between
the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges cannot be explained
on utilitarian grounds. The hypothetical referred to above could in-

131. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the clergy member’s duty of confidentiality,
based on a God-ordained rule, is not exactly comparable to professional codes of ethics. See
supra notes 70–76, 108–09 and accompanying text.
132. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285; see supra Parts II.A.1.b and II.A.2.b.; see also
supra text accompanying note 67.
133. See supra Parts II.A.1.c and II.A.2.c.
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volve an individual who fears that his behavior constitutes abuse. If
such an individual had the misfortune of living in a state that had simultaneously abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege and maintained
the attorney-client privilege, he would be placed in a precarious position.134 The absurdity of providing for the solution of legal problems,
but not the underlying causes of harmful behavior, highlights the
grave fallacy of the current attack on the clergy-penitent privilege.
B. You Have the (Privacy) Right to Remain Silent
Some authors have argued that evidentiary privileges are justified
because an individual right to privacy makes forced disclosure of confidential communications morally wrong regardless of the benefits to
society.135 One author describes evidentiary privileges under a rights
regime as “a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom . . .
from the state’s coercive or supervisory powers.”136 Despite these arguments, courts have been reluctant to adopt the privacy rationale
for evidentiary privileges.137 The privacy rationale’s apparent threat to
the status quo under the utilitarian rationale may explain this reluctance. Another possible explanation is that the privacy rationale does
not avoid the problems of the utilitarian rationale, the claims of some
authors138 notwithstanding. This is so because the judicial preservation of a privilege on privacy grounds still requires a judge to balance
the individual’s privacy interest against the societal interest in obtaining evidence.139 Either way, the privacy rationale’s underlying argu-

134. See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 266:
The folly of preferential treatment for attorneys may readily be seen by imagining a
scenario in which a lawyer has secured the confidential admission of her client regarding past abuse. She wishes to advise the client to seek treatment in hopes of preventing future abuse, but understands that any other professional to whom the client is referred will be required to report the prior conduct if disclosed during
therapy. In that situation, preserving the privilege for the lawyer alone has limited
utility and little theoretical cogency.
135. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 89 (1973) (“[I]t is not a
farfetched view that personal evidentiary privileges go to the heart of the modern American
citizen’s need for a right of privacy.”); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956).
136. Louisell, supra note 135, at 110–11.
137. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 72.
138. See Louisell, supra note 135, at 111 (claiming that the Wigmore prerequisites lead
to conclusions that are “sometimes highly conjectural and defy scientific validation”).
139. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1482–83. “Because of this balancing, the privacy
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ment remains persuasive because it elevates the discussion of confidential communications to individual and group rights to meet the
challenge of increasing government interference. Since the privacy
rationale’s inherent persuasiveness may lead it to provide the basis for
future legislation or judicial decisions, it merits consideration in relation to the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges.
Since they both concern activities that are highly personal, the
clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges appear to satisfy the
fundamental requirement for protection under the privacy rationale.
However, the strength of the privacy rationale for the clergy-penitent
or attorney-client privileges may be distinguished by the nature of
the communications they protect. When an individual seeks legal advice, she seeks to obtain knowledge regarding her legal relation to
the state or other individuals.140 Thus, confidential attorney-client
communications allow individuals to order their legal relations without surrendering to the state or other individuals a significant advantage. In contrast, an individual seeks to confess to a member of the
clergy due to concern for her relationship with God. Thus, confidential clergy-penitent communications allow individuals to order their
spiritual lives without state interference. The state must concern itself
with its legal relation to individual citizens and the legal relations of
its individual citizens. Therefore, the attorney-client privilege creates
privacy in an area of public concern. Since the state has no interest in
regulating an individual’s relationship with God, the clergy-penitent
privilege maintains privacy in an eminently private area. Whereas it
protects an activity that is inherently more private, the clergypenitent privilege claims stronger support from the privacy rationale
than does the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the privacy rationale
does not justify the trend of abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege and preservation of the attorney-client privilege.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
Supreme Court acknowledgement of a constitutional basis for
the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges remains limited.
Still, consideration of the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privi-

rationale is just as indeterminate as the traditional [utilitarian] justification.” Id. at 1483.
140. See Charles Fried, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 586
(1977) (arguing that it is “immoral for society to constrain anyone from discovering what the
limits of its power over him are”).
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leges in light of the Constitution of the United States provides another useful framework for the evaluation of the current status of
these privileges in relation to abuse-reporting laws.
A. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege and the Religion Clauses
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment141 protect the clergy-penitent
privilege from state interference, it has expressed significant approval
of the privilege in several opinions.142 The following provides an
overview of the arguments that should persuade the Court to protect
the clergy-penitent privilege under the First Amendment.
1. The Free Exercise Clause
Whether the Free Exercise Clause requires the existence of the
clergy-penitent privilege may hinge on the test articulated in Employment Division v. Smith.143 Under Smith, a particular law does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause if it is a “valid and neutral law of
general applicability.”144 Abuse-reporting laws that impose either a
universal145 or otherwise very broad duty to report would probably
be upheld under Smith’s neutral and general applicability requirements. However, the lack of neutrality and general applicability of
abuse-reporting laws that single out clergy as mandatory reporters
while maintaining the confidentiality of other comparable communications146 may be found to violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Under Smith, the Supreme Court may still be compelled to apply

141. The First Amendment states in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . or abridging the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
142. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-penitent
privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation
and guidance in return.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“[G]enerally,
an attorney or a priest may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional
confidence.”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (“[P]ublic policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential . . . suits cannot be maintained
which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional.”).
143. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
144. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
146. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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the Free Exercise test first articulated in Sherbert v. Verner147 if a Free
Exercise claim is combined with a claim based on another constitutional right.148 Possible “hybrid”149 claims could combine a Free Exercise claim with claims under the First Amendment’s free speech
and association provisions or the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause.150 In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,151 the Supreme Court declared that “a corresponding
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends”152 is implicit in the First Amendment. Under the Roberts analysis,153 clergy
members and penitents arguably engage in expressive association
through the clergy-penitent relationship.154 Since it is likely to degrade or completely deter confession,155 abrogation of the clergypenitent privilege probably constitutes a violation of the right to expressive association. The Supreme Court may also find a liberty interest in clergy-penitent communications that merits protection under the Due Process Clause. Summarizing decades of jurisprudence,
the Court declared that substantive due process protection is afforded to rights and interests that are both “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition”156 and carefully described.157 While

147. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
148. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
149. Id. at 882.
150. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: “nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
151. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
152. Id. at 622.
153. To determine if a group is protected by the right recognized in Roberts, the Court
first determines if the group engages in “expressive association.” See Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). This right “is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come
within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.” Id. Second, the Court analyzed the facts to determine if the challenged state action violated the right to expressive association. Id. at 650–56. The Roberts court defined violation of
the right of expressive association as “intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association.” 468 U.S. at 623.
154. For example, in Christ-centered religions, confession and similar counseling involves
expression of beliefs regarding the need to repent and the possibility of one’s sins being forgiven through Jesus Christ.
155. See supra note 81; infra note 161 and accompanying text.
156. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
157. See id. at 721.
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careful description should pose no problem, the clergy-penitent
privilege’s undisputed place in American history and tradition158
should ensure its protection under the Due Process Clause.
If the Court were to acknowledge that abrogation of the clergypenitent privilege provides a basis for a valid hybrid claim, it would
proceed to ask whether the law in question imposed an undue “burden” on the free exercise of religion, whether the law was justified by
a “compelling state interest,” and whether it used the least restrictive
means available to achieve that interest.159 Under the Sherbert test,
the claimant would rely on specific religious teachings or rules160 to
demonstrate the religious significance of confession or similar spiritual counseling in the church involved. The Court is likely to acknowledge the existence of a religious belief when an individual has
confessed sins to a clergy member believing such confession had religious significance. Next, the claimant would present evidence
regarding diminution of trust between clergy and penitents and the
resulting deterrence of confession161 to demonstrate that abrogation
of the clergy-penitent privilege has imposed a significant burden on
religious belief. The Court is likely to acknowledge that actual deterrence of confession “impede[s] the observance of one or all religions”162 and therefore constitutes a significant burden on the Free
Exercise of religion.
Since child abuse is a serious problem in the United States,163
child abuse prevention is undoubtedly a compelling state interest. At
this point however, the question remains for the Court whether this
state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify interference with the
clergy-penitent privilege. The Court’s characterization of the reli158. This Comment has touched only briefly on the history of the clergy-penitent privilege (see supra notes 88–91). For a comprehensive treatment of the clergy-penitent privilege’s
history, see Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983).
159. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406–07; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
160. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
161. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (1997) (The court stated that
“knowledge, belief, or suspicion that freely-confessed sins would become public would operate
as a serious deterrent to participation in the sacrament and an odious detriment accompanying
participation [by penitent]. When the prosecutor asserts the right to tape the sacrament he not
only intrudes upon the confession taped but . . . he invades their free exercise of religion.”).
162. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1961)).
163. See supra note 10.
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gious and governmental interests under consideration may determine
the outcome of this part of the analysis.164 If the Court avoids tilting
the scales in either direction,165 the outcome of this balancing test
could conceivably go either way. Of course, identification of a compelling government interest does not end the analysis. Before engaging in a full least-restrictive-means analysis, the Court should determine whether the means employed by the state are viable at all.166 In
the case at hand, the Court should ask whether abrogation of the
clergy-penitent privilege merits consideration as a viable “means” of
preventing child abuse.167 Since it is impossible to prove that abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege will prevent child abuse,168 the
Court should not simply assume that abrogation achieves such an
outcome. Instead, the Court could be persuaded at this point that
abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege is an ineffective169 or
counterproductive means170 of protecting children or that alternative
means exist to ensure child health and safety.171 If it were to determine for any of these reasons that the abrogation of the clergypenitent privilege is not a viable means to achieve the state’s purpose,
the Court would probably conclude that the Free Exercise Clause
requires the continued existence of the clergy-penitent privilege.
While the Court could adopt the preceding argument, some authors
have discussed plausible ways in which the Court could fail to afford
such protection to the clergy-penitent privilege under the Free Exer164. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 807–10.
165. See id. at 808. Mitchell points out that the issue could be framed “as a balancing of
the cleric’s right to keep secrets” against the state’s interest “in protecting abused children.”
Id. Similarly, the issue could be framed as a balancing between a “cleric’s right to the free exercise of religion” and a state’s interest in pursuing one of many law enforcement strategies. Id.
166. See id. at 810–18.
167. See id.
168. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 811–15.
Here Mitchell argues that clergy have “a good argument that the state stands to gain no additional information from requiring objecting clergy to report.” Mitchell, supra note 17, at 812.
170. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 818
(“[M]andating clergy reports is counterproductive to the state’s goal of protecting children. If
the prospect of disclosure will deter people from approaching clergy for help, the choice is not
between help from the state and help from clergy, it is between help from clergy and no help at
all. By discouraging persons from seeking private help, reporting requirements may preclude
some troubled people from seeking any help at all.”) (citations omitted).
171. See supra text accompanying note 104; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 815–16 (“Other
persons, for example, are required to report suspected cases of child abuse and can do so without offense to their religious beliefs.”).
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cise Clause and the compelling government interest/least-restrictivemeans test.172
The possibility (under either Smith or Sherbert) that the Constitution does not prohibit forcing clergy to choose between working
as state informants and imprisonment demonstrates the inadequacy
of the jurisprudential tests that the Supreme Court has superimposed
on the Free Exercise Clause. The situation at hand demonstrates
how these tests function like crude simplifications, providing states
with simple formulas (legislate in general terms or identify a compelling government interest) guaranteed to insulate legislation from
Free Exercise scrutiny. In contrast to the current situation, the Phillips court in 1813173 recognized, consistent with the Founders’ understanding of the words “free exercise of religion,”174 that the First
Amendment guaranteed state accommodation of the clergy-penitent
privilege. As Professor McConnell points out, the language of the
First Amendment was informed by the founding generation’s interest in freedom to worship and not just freedom from state-imposed
worship.175 This understanding of the phrase “free exercise of religion” supports constitutionally mandated maintenance of the clergypenitent privilege today. The Court may not avoid ruling on the
constitutionality of the clergy-penitent privilege forever. Forced to
deal with the constitutionality of the clergy-penitent privilege, the
Supreme Court would have an opportunity to devise an analysis
based on the historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause; an
analysis that requires lawmakers on every level to do more than seek
172. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 11, at 985–95; Ronald J. Columbo, Forgive Us Our Sins:
The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 235–36 (1998).
173. See supra notes 1, 3–5 and accompanying text.
174. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1512:
[T]he evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinning of the free exercise clause,
best reflected in Madison’s writings, is that the claims of the “universal sovereign”
precede the claims of civil society, both in time and in authority, and that when the
people vested power in the government over civil affairs, they necessarily reserved
their unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, in accordance with the dictates
of conscience. Under this understanding, the right of free exercise is defined in the
first instance not by the nature and scope of the laws, but by nature and scope of religious duty. A religious duty does not cease to be a religious duty merely because
the legislature has passed a generally applicable law making compliance difficult or
impossible.
175. See id. at 1516–17 (concluding that the understanding that Free Exercise guaranteed “the freedom to follow religious dogma” distinguished the understanding of those “who
provided the political muscle for religious freedom in America” from Locke and Jefferson’s
enlightenment understanding of Free Exercise).
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the shelter from Free Exercise scrutiny that Smith or even Sherbert
provide.
2. The Establishment Clause
At first glance, state abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege
may seem to raise only Free Exercise issues. However, since it constitutes government interference with church autonomy, such abrogation also raises serious Establishment Clause issues. According to
Professor Esbeck, the Establishment Clause is best understood as a
structural restraint on government interference in areas that are reserved exclusively to religion.176 Among many other arguments in
support of his thesis,177 Professor Esbeck demonstrates how the Supreme Court has applied the Establishment Clause as a structural restraint on government power.178 For example, the Court exempted
parochial schools from compliance when unemployment compensation taxes and mandatory collective bargaining laws would have interfered with church autonomy as it relates to employment practices.179 While it would not change the outcome of many
Establishment Clause claims, this understanding would affect cases in
which state regulation imposes a burden on church autonomy.180
Thus, the current analysis would consist of determining whether
abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege would amount to a state
intrusion into the “sphere of autonomy”181 reserved for religion by
the Establishment Clause. In general terms, this sphere of autonomy
includes “ecclesiastical governance, the resolution of doctrine, the
176. See Esbeck, supra note 7, at 10–11.
177. For example, Esbeck argues that the Court’s relaxation of standing requirements in
Establishment Clause cases illustrates that the central concern in such cases is not the vindication of individual religious rights, but limitation of government intrusion into areas reserved
exclusively for church action. See id. at 33–40. Esbeck’s other supporting arguments relate to
remedies (see id. at 40–42), church autonomy (see id. at 42–58), and the nondelegation rule
(see id. at 58–60).
178. See id. at 44–45 (citing cases to demonstrate that the court has identified at least
four categories of government activity that the Establishment Clause forbids).
179. See id at 78–79 (citing St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
451 U.S. 772, 780–81 (1981) (regarding unemployment taxes) and NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (regarding mandatory collective bargaining laws)).
180. See id. at 77 (“[R]egulatory burdens that touch on matters in the religious domain . . . violate no-establishment. This is so, not as a matter of group or associational rights,
but as a matter of government exceeding its jurisdiction as limited by the Establishment
Clause.”).
181. Id.
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composing of prayers, and the teaching of religion.”182 “[T]he admission, guidance, expected moral behavior, and excommunication
of church members,”183 a specific area within this sphere, is particularly relevant in relation to the question at hand. For many, confession is an ordinance, or is closely related to sacramental ordinances,
of the highest religious significance.184 Confession or similar spiritual
counseling also involves significant religious instruction.185 Beyond
this, confession of certain sins can result in church disciplinary action,
such as excommunication.186 Since abrogation of the clergy-penitent
privilege will deter confession,187 it would necessarily interfere with
church autonomy as it relates to religious ordinances, instruction,
and church disciplinary action. Accepting Esbeck’s thesis, the Establishment Clause would not tolerate this outcome. Although unnecessary under the structural restraint analysis, this conclusion can be
stated in the terms of the generally acknowledged Establishment
Clause test.188 Thus, even if based on a secular purpose, abrogation
of the clergy-penitent privilege would clearly inhibit religion while
increasing government entanglement in the areas of religious ordinances, instruction, and church disciplinary action. Forced to rule on
the issue, the Court arguably should acknowledge under the structural restraint analysis—or at least Lemon—that the Establishment
Clause limits the power of the state to interfere with the clergypenitent privilege.

182. Id. at 10–11.
183. Id. at 45 n.175 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871) for the
proposition that “there is no court jurisdiction as to church discipline or the conformity of
members to the standard of morals required of them”).
184. For example, Roman Catholics consider confession a necessary ordinance, while
confession for members of the LDS church is part of a repentance process that requires the
observance of a separate ordinance (the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper) to receive forgiveness
for sins.
185. See supra note 154.
186. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 81 and 161 and accompanying text.
188. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971), the Supreme Court determined that a law does not violate the Establishment Clause if: (1) it is based on a “secular legislative purpose”; (2) its effect “neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) it does not entail “excessive government entanglement with religion.”
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B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
One author has observed that “[a]lthough often associated with
constitutional rights . . . most of the breadth and sweep of the attorney-client privilege is without constitutional protection.”189 In Fisher
v. United States,190 the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination191 does not prevent
the state from compelling an attorney to divulge confidential client
information.192 The Fisher court reasoned that requiring an attorney
to reveal information that the client voluntarily gave to the attorney
did not compel the accused in any way.193 Furthermore, the Fisher
court determined that documents compelled from an attorney “contain[ed] no testimonial declarations” by the accused and therefore
failed to qualify under another key aspect of the Fifth Amendment’s
right against compelled self-incrimination.194 In contrast, the Sixth
Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel195 is generally
taken to require some degree of confidential consultation with an attorney.196 Still, the Supreme Court has not provided much detail regarding the scope of the privilege required by the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment’s coverage
is limited: it applies only to criminal proceedings and only after the
formal accusation of a suspect.197 Therefore, except in the case of
formally accused criminal defendants, the Constitution does not prevent legislative limitation of the attorney-client privilege.198
189. Mosteller, supra note 39, at 269. For a more in-depth treatment of the constitutional status of the attorney-client privilege, see Mosteller, supra note 39, at 269–72.
190. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
191. The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: “[no person] shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
192. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402.
193. Id. at 397.
194. Id. at 409.
195. The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
196. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between
the accused and his attorney.”); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 552 (1977).
197. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986) (stating that the right to effective
assistance of counsel only applies after the initiation of adversarial proceedings); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972) (stating that the right to effective assistance of counsel
applies only when judicial proceedings have been initiated by “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”).
198. See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 272 (concluding that “[t]he attorney client privilege
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IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION
While nothing in the preceding constitutional analysis justifies
the current situation, the arguments in support of the clergy-penitent
privilege199 suggest that it merits more constitutional protection than
does the attorney-client privilege. Similarly, since it provides greater
social utility200 while protecting an inherently more private interest,201 the clergy-penitent privilege should, if anything, hold a
stronger position than the attorney-client privilege in the laws of the
several states. Since the current trend contradicts all of these conclusions, it is necessary to look beyond the traditional rationales and
constitutional arguments to consider alternative explanations for the
current situation.
A. Attorney Self-Interest
The difference in status between the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges may be explained by the fact that judges and
many legislators are attorneys.202 In one sense, this is neither controversial nor surprising. Education and livelihood in the law should
compel lawyers to protect a privilege that is probably essential to the
sound operation of the legal system.203 The influence of attorney selfinterest is not confined to the law of evidentiary privileges; such influence probably accounts for the rule that attorneys are paid first in
bankruptcy proceedings,204 or the unusually high standards of proof
applied in attorney malpractice cases.205 Like the attorney-client privilege, these legal rules are probably justified by legitimate concerns.
However, attorney self-interest becomes a problem if it leads to the
neglect of other important interests. One can easily imagine how
such neglect may account for the destruction of the clergy-penitent
as it applies to reporting of child abuse . . . depends largely upon the good judgment of legislatures and their determination of sound social policy”).
199. See supra Part III.A.
200. See supra Part II.A.3.
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5472 (1986) (discussing attorney self-interest and the attorney-client
privilege).
203. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
204. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 7-11 (1993).
205. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 266 (9th ed. 1994).
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privilege. Attorneys engaged in lawmaking may simply put forth
more effort to protect the attorney-client privilege than the clergypenitent privilege. To such attorneys, challenges to the attorneyclient privilege probably seem much more urgent than challenges to
clergy-penitent privilege. And faced with pressure to abrogate evidentiary privileges in the legislative process, such attorneys may respond by sacrificing the clergy-penitent privilege (among others) so
long as the attorney-client privilege is maintained. Since many of the
clergy-penitent privilege’s beneficiaries are not entrusted with making and applying the law, those who are so entrusted should concern
themselves more with the preservation of the clergy-penitent privilege.
B. Legislation That Appears to Help
Another explanation for the status of the clergy-penitent and
attorney-client privileges in relation to abuse-reporting laws is the
temptation to legislate in broad strokes when faced with a problem
like child abuse. Dealing with child abuse on the state level raises difficult questions about how a state may pursue the interests of children while not impeding private institutions (families, churches,
therapists, etc.) that are probably much better suited to care for children. Rather than address this question, abuse-reporting laws rely on
the troubling presumption that the state must get involved. This is
troubling because clergy-penitent communications may diminish
child abuse.206 Thus, legislators truly concerned about child-abuse
prevention should be cautious about interfering with clergy-penitent
communications—and should be suspicious of any claim that abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege will actually prevent child
abuse.207 Absent other justifications to interfere with long-established
privileges, it is conceivable that such legislators are motivated by a
desire to appear “tough on crime.” After all, from the standpoint of
one seeking reelection, the actual effect of a law may seem less important than how voters perceive the legislator’s intentions.

206. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
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C. Suspect Assumptions About Clergy
Finally, each decision to abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege
through an abuse-reporting law implies the judgment that clergy
members have nothing to contribute in the effort against child
abuse. Of course, there is no reasonable basis to presume the incompetence of clergy or the competence of the state in relation to abuse
prevention. Much to the contrary, it seems reasonable to presume
that the bureaucratic machinery of the state will rarely deliver the
kind of thoughtful, individualized care that clergy provide when voluntarily contacted by individuals seeking to improve their lives.208
Beyond this, starting with a presumption that members of the clergy
are incompetent to deal with serious problems is comparable to an
assessment regarding the validity of a religious belief or practice.
Such assessments have no place in the law.209 The scrutiny that they
would invite forces express government assessments of religion below the surface of legal rhetoric. For this reason, lawmakers should
give serious consideration to the unspoken judgments that may lie
beneath a particular decision to abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege.
V. CONCLUSION
While the attorney-client privilege remains strong, the clergypenitent privilege has been abrogated to a significant degree through
abuse-reporting laws. This has happened even though constitutional
arguments and analysis under the traditional justifications for evidentiary privileges suggest that, if anything, the clergy-penitent privilege
merits more protection than does the attorney-client privilege. The
Supreme Court should hold that both religion clauses of the First
Amendment forbid government interference with the clergy-penitent
privilege. Still, the Supreme Court may fail to live up to the standard
set by People v. Phillips.210 Regardless, the opportunity to solve the
problem posed by the attack on the clergy-penitent privilege currently remains with the states. Attorney self-interest, hollow attempts
to appear effective, and hostility to religion may explain the current

208. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text; see also supra note 12.
209. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (“[I]t is no business of courts
to say . . . what is a religious practice or activity.”).
210. See supra notes 1, 3–6.
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situation. State lawmakers should strive to overcome these influences
as well as any others that prevent them from giving the clergypenitent privilege the place it deserves in the law.
Shawn P. Bailey
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